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THE SIEGE OF HERAT 
1837--18)8 
John Carl Nelson 
A condition of economic exhaustion and political anarchy pre-
vailed in Iran by 1800. The great empires of the 1600' s had collapsed 
and in the wars that followed the prosperity of the area was destroyed. 
The city of Herat was a microcosm of the general conditions. After 
1797 the Kajar dynasty tried to restore the Persian empire to its fonner 
limits but their efforts met with only limited success and Herat remained 
their goal in the east. Afghanistan was torn apart by tribal tensions 
in lBlB and Herat became more vulnerable. The Russian empire achieved a 
position of dominance in Western Asia after 1828. The British felt that 
this was a threat to their own empire in India and tried to erect a 
buffer to guard against Russian infiuence. They saw Persian efforts to 
take Herat in the 1830's as an extension of Russian influence and a 
threat to India. 
After 1835 Russia encouraged Persia to take Herat. The Russians 
perhap&. hoped to provoke a break between Britain and Persia thus displac-
ing British infiuence which had been growing. The Persian army laid 
siege to Herat in 1837 but its efforts to take the city were ineffective • 
. The Russian ambassador to Persia sent agents into Afghanistan to arrange 
a coalition of states against Herat. The British saw this as a direct 
intrusion into their buffer area and when Kabul sided with Persia the 
British decided to send an anny into Afghanistan. The Persians failed 
to take Herat but the British still considered it necessary to occupy 
Afghanistan. Their occupying army was destroyed in 1842 but since the 
Persian and Russian threat had abated no further action was necessary. 
Each of the parties involved failed in their immediate objectives 
but as a result the relations in this area were defined until 1906. 
Persia and Afghanistan lost the freedom to act independently. Russia's 
dominant position in Persia was maintained but the British could not be 
excluded. Afghanistan was finnly made part of the Indian imperial 
system and the city of Herat became its outermost limit. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Mohammed Shah Kajar, ruler of Persia, was detennined to possess 
the Afghan city' of Her{it; a city long known as the "Key to India." On 
June 23, 1837 he marched out of Tehran towards Herat, 650 miles to the 
east. After two earlier frustrated attempts to take the city, he did 
not intend to fail again. 
Count Ivan Simonich, the Russian Minister to Persia, had en-
couraged~the expedition from the beginning and had made promises of 
Russian aid. On the other hand, the British Minister to Persia, Sir 
John McNeill, had consistently pointed out the difficulties and had made 
clear the official British disapproval of the whole affair. At the last 
minute, the Shah had doubts of Russian support in case of real British 
opposition but Count Simonich was able to reassure him and he marched. 
The events that unfolded during the next few years as a conse-
quence of the Shah's decision determined the pattern of relations in 
this part of the world for the rest of the nineteenth century. The 
interests of Britain and Russia came into sharp conflict for the first 
time and limits were set to the power of each that were not to be 
exceeded. The affair also made clear that Persia, Afghanistan, and the 
other states of the area were no longer in control of their own destinies, 
but were becoming pawns in a power struggle between outside powers. 
iv 
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HER.AT AND THE FORMATION OF PERSIA AND AFGHANisrAN 
1500--1800 
Herat had withstood many sieges during its troubled history and 
had fallen to many conquerors. In the early fifteenth century it was 
the capital of a wide empire ruled by the son of Tamerlane, but his 
successors allowed this empire to dWindle until in 1506 Herat fell to 
the Uzbegs, fresh invaders from Central Asia. Four years later the 
Uzbegs were pushed aside by Shah Ismail Safavi, the founder of a re-
vitalized Persian empire, and Herat, along with the cities of Mashad, 
Merv, and Kandahar, became one of the Governor-Generalships of the 
eastern Sa.favid province of Khorasan.
1 
The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were times of great 
empires in Western Asia. Safavid Persia coexisted with the Mogul empire 
of India, the Uzbeg Khanate of Bukhara, the Ottoman empire, and the 
emerging empire of Russia. There were fluctuations in the borders 
between them, and ~ccasionally bitter wars, but on the whole these 
empires gave a good measure of stability to Western Asia for 200 years. 
The collapse of this stability in the mid-eighteenth century opened the 
way to the intervention of outside powers in the area. 
1v. Minorsky, trans., Tadhkirat al-Mulk, a Manual of Safavid 
- Administration Translated and lained (Cambridge, England: Luzac and 
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Safavid Persia reached its peak in power and prosperity under 
Shah Abbas (1586-1628). Abbas' conquests and refonns gave the empire a 
hundred years of peace but there also began a process of intenial decay.
2 
As the Safavid empire declined, its control over the border areas weak-
ened. A revolt of the Ghilzai tribe at Kandahar in 1709 culminated in 
their sack of Isfahan, the Sa.favid capital, and the deposition of the 
Safavi dynasty. Chaos ensued as Afghans, Turks, and Russians descended 
3 
upon the land. Persia was occupied and partitioned. 
One of the Safavid generals, Nadir Kuli, was able to provide the 
leadership that the last Safavid Shahs had lacked. In 1729 h"e led an 
anny that by 1735 delivered central Persia from the invaders and in that 
year he proclaimed himself Shah. After careful preparation he next 
conducted a great campaign in the east. From 1737 to 1740 he marched to 
Kandahar, Delhi, and Bukhara, crushing the Ghilzais and dealing the Mogul 
and Uzbe'g empires crippling blows from which they never recove;red. The 
assassination of Nadir in 1747 however, was the signal for renewed 
anarchy.4 
The destruction of Safavid Persia allowed tribal forces there to 
gain control and in the process a lasting division of Persia was created. 
While Nadir's heirs clung precariously to Mashad, the Zand and Kajar 
tribes battled for control of the westeni provinces and the Durrani tribe 
2Lawrence Lockhart, The Fall of the Safavi 
Occupation of Persia (Cambridge, England: 
1-34. 
3Lockhart, The Fall of the Safa vi Dynasty and the Afghan Occupa-
tion of Persia, pp. 89-297. 
4r.awrence Lockhart, Nadir Shah. A Critical. Stu Based Mainl on 
Contemporary Sources (London: Luzac and Co., 193 , p. 1 ff. 
1 
gained possession of the east. The land was devastated. Khorasan 
especially became a battlefield; there were invasions from both east and 
west as well as Uzbeg raids from the north. Within forty years following 
1719, Herat changed hands five times and was under siege for a tota.l(of 
24 months. 
The Zand tribe gained a brief ascendency in the west under Karim 
Khan, but after his death in 1778 the tribe fell apart in bitter civil 
wars. Aga Mohammed Khan took advantage of this situation to lead his 
, Kajar tribe to victory and although he was assassinated in 1797 he left 
a fairly stable throne in Persia to his successor.
5 
In the east after 
Nadir's assassination, Ahmad Shah of the Durrani tribe gained control of 
Khorasan, including Herat, but his ma.in effort was against India where 
he brought the entire In,dus river basin under Afghan rule.
6 
The end result was that by 1800 what had been a relatively 
stable situqtion in which great empires coexisted was replaced by a 
highly unstable composition of tribal states. The Kajar rulers of Persia 
considered themselves the successors of the Safa.vids, and consciously 
tried to restore the outward appearance of that empire, but their efforts 
1 
were to be less than successful. The Afghan dominion la.eked this 
5Gavin Hambly, "Aqa Mohammed Khan and the Establishment of the 
Qa.ja.r Dynasty," Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, I, Part 1 
(April, 1963) • tp 
6Ganda Singh, Ahmad Shah Durrani, Father of Modern Afghanistan 
(Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1959), p~ 24 ff • 
..,_o....-.. 
7 Ann K. s.- Lambton, "Persian Society U~der the Q~jars, 11 Journal 
of the Royal Central Asian Societr, XLVIII (1961), 125-28; Rouhollah K. 
Ramazani, The Foreign Policy of Iran; A Developing Nation in World 
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tradition to fall back on since it encompassed the border areas of three 
empires. The Mogul empire had vanished in all but name. The Uzbeg 
Khanate had broken up. The Ottoman .empire had lost control of many out-
lying areas. Russia, however, had grown strong and its power was being 
increasingly felt in the neighboring areas. 
8 Herat was a microcosm of conditions in Iran at this time. 
Geographically, Iran was a land of contrasts. High mountains gave way 
to fiat plains and fertile river valleys existed next to sterile deserts. 
Mountains and deserts restricted travel and communications to certain 
well-defined routes. The most important one ran from the west through 
Tabriz, Mashad, Herat, and Kandahar to India. This route was an impor-
tant artery of trade since ancient times and the only way from east to 
west that was practical for large armies with heavy artillery. Major 
cities along the way had great strategic value. Herat was especially 
important since it was also a crossroads for routes going north to 
Bukhara and Central Asia. It functioned as the chief point of trade a,nd 
communications for all Khorasan and beyond. 9 
The city of Herat was situated in a fertile river valley with 
mountains on the north and east, and deserts to the west and south. 
Although it had a population of 100,000 and was the second largest city 
in Iran in 1800, its former prosperity was gone. Ruined suburbs sur-
rounded the city and large areas within the walls lay abandoned. The 
8rran will be used to refer to this geographical area. Persia 
and AfghanIS'tan will refer only to the Political units. 
9oavin Hambly, "An Introduction to the Economic Organization or 
Early Qajar Iran," ~' II (1964), 79. 
-------------------~--~----~ ---~- -
9 
walls themselves were neglected and many sections had collapsed. In the 
countryside, irrigation works were in disrepair and although two crops 
were harvested a year, the prod~pe was barely sufficient for local needs. 
The peasants of the district and most of the city dwellers were Persian 
in both language and tradition but numerous Turkish and Afghan nomad 
tribes lived in the surrounding mountains and deserts, and they dominated 
the settled population....10 
Two fundamental problems in Iran at this time were drastic de-
population and the collapse of the _urban economy. There are no hard 
statistics but the population of Iran seems to have declined by as much 
as half during the eighteenth century. European visitors were particular-
ly struck by the desolate aspects of the cities and the ruined suburbs 
that surrounded them. One reason for this was the continual wars of the 
period. Almost every district was devastated at least once, some many 
times. The second important reason was the withering away of the trans-
continental trade that had nourished Iranian cities since ancient times. 
Trade routes had shifted to the sea and the interior cities sank to little 
more than centers for local production and marketing.
11 
As a result of this economic situation, governments could no 
longer draw enough wealth from the cities to sustain themselves and the 
llHambly; "Economic Organization," 70-71; Gregorian, The 
Emergence of Modern Afghanistan, pp. 22, 52-58. 
10 
tribal elements emerged in a dominant position. According to some 
estimates, the nomads comprised at least half the population in 1800.12 
The tribal leaders ~wed their positions to tribal custom, not to the 
state, and the state was forced to rely on their independent military 
forces. The greatest problem the Kajar and Durrani rulers faced was how 
13 to bring the tribes under their control. The early Kajars followed a 
policy of divide and rule with some success but the Durranis faced more 
difficult problems and were less successful. 
12Mountstuart Elphinstone, Account of the Kin dom of Caubul and 
endencies in Persia Tarta and India London: Longman, etc., 
, p. 231; Hamb~y,. "Economic Organization," 70. 
13Elphinstone, Account of the Kingdom of Caubul, pp. 210-17; 
Arin K. S. Lambton, "Persia, The Breakdown of a Society," The Central 
Islamic Lands, P. M. Holt et. al. eds., Vol. I of The Cambridge History 




Persia had a long tradition as a great empire ruled by a King of 
Kings and the next task of the early Kajar rulers, having restored in-
ternal security, was to recover the border areas and restore the empire 
to the preceding Safavid limits. Aga Mohammed Khan, founder of the Kajar 
dynasty, had begun by invading Georgia and Khorasan arid Persian efforts 
continued to be directed towards these two a~as. 
The first moves of his successor, Fath Ali Shah, were in the 
east. In 1799 he advanced to Mashad but stopped there when he learned 
t:r...at the Afghan ruler, Zaman Shah, had marched to Herat. In 1802 the 
Persians were in Mashad again where they consolidated their hold and 
three years later they attacked Herat. Internal troubles in Afghanistan 
prevented aid from reaching the Afghan governor there, and after a 
Persian victory at Ghurian, he ceded that border fortress to Persia and 
agreed to pay tribute for Herat.
1 
Persia was prevented from following 
up thi_s success however, because war had broken out with Russia. 
Russia had begun to move south of the Caucasus mountains in the 
late eighteenth century. Georgia was first made a protectorate and in 
1Eliphinstone, Caubulz pp. 596-97; Robert G. Watson, A Histo~ 
of Persi~ .from the B-~ fiin+=·-of the Nineteenth Centu to the Year 1B8 
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1801 was annexed to the Russian empire. But Georgia had once belonged 
to Persia and :in fact it was Aga Mohammed Khan's invasion of their land 
in 1795 that finally led the Georgians to submit to Russia for protec-
2 
tion. War was brought on by Russian encroachment on the Persian vassal 
khanates of northern Azerbaijan. Initial Russian successes were offset 
by the need to divert troops and supplies to wars with Turkey and France 
but by 1813 the Persians had had enough. Fath Ali Shah recognized the 
' 3 Tsar's rule in Georgia and ceded the disputed Khanates as well. 
During this war Persia first became involved in European diplo-
macy. Napoleon's invasion of Egypt :in 1798 and the Afghan Zaman Shah 1 s 
repeated wars in the Punjab aroused British fears for their possessions 
in India.
4 
Persia was seen by Britain as a potential check on both these 
threats and a mission was sent to Persia from India in 1801. But when 
Zaman Shah was deposed and Britain made peace with Napoleon, these 
feelers were not followed through. The French on the other hand saw a 
way to get at both Britain and Russia through Persia. In 1807 Persia 
signed a treaty with France and welcomed a French military mission. When 
Napoleon made peace with Russia later that year however, the French 
pulled out and British interest in Persia revived. Britain signed a 
treaty with Persia in 1812 and reaffirmed it in 1814, and this treaty 
2David M. Lang, The Last Years of the Geor ian Monarc 
1837 (New York: ColUI11bia University, 19 7 , pp. 20 -0 
3John F. Baddeley, The Russian Conguest of the Caucasus (New 
York: Russell and Russell, 1908), pp. 57-91 •. 
4a. J. Alder, "Britain and the Defence of India -- The Origins 




lasted up to the siege of Herat. The chief provisions of this treaty 
were that: 
1) Persia would oppose any European army that attempted to 
invade India by way of Central Asia. 
3) The defensive articles (4 & 6) would apply only in cases 
where the outside power was the aggressor (the only differ-
ence between the 1812 and 1814 treaties, this article was 
added to give the British a loophole). 
4) Britain would aid Persia with either troops from India or 
a yearly subsidy in the event Persia became involved in a war 
with any European power. 
6) This aid would be given even if Britain was at peace with 
the European power. 
7) Persia would attack Afghanistan if the latter was at war 
with Britain. 
8) Britain wguld not interfere in any war between Persia and 
Afghanistan. 
Persia's activities in the east had been curtailed while fight-
ing Russia. The occasion of a major revolt by tribal chiefs in Khorasan 
in 1811 was used by the Afghans to retake Ghurian and stop paying tribute 
for Herat. Other revolts followed the unsuccessful war with Russia and 
it was not until 1816 that another effort could be made to advance the 
eastern frontiers. In that year the governor of Mashad advanced on 
Herat but this time the Afghans were able to send a substantial army 
from their capitol of Kabul to the scene. There was a battle in which 
7 
both sides claimed victory but the Persians did not get Herat. 
During the 1820's Persia was occupied with war along the Turkish 
border, and more seriously, a second war with Russia. Persia was 
5sir Percy Sykes, A History of Persia, II (London: Macmillan, 
1915), pp. 395-409. 
6c. U. Aitchison, ed., A Coll~ction of Treaties En a ements and 
Sunnuds Relating to India and Neighboring Countries, VII Calcutta: 
Government Printing, 1865), pp. 121-129. 
7Joseph P. Ferrier, History of the Afghans (London: J. Murray, 
1858), pp. 151-156; Robert Watson, A History of Persia, pp. 193-197. 
-----------------------------
16 
dissatisfied with the settlement of 1813 in the Caucasus and in 1826, 
after the initial outbreak of fighting, a massive Persian invasion threw 
back the Russian forces. Russia recovered swiftly however, and in the 
following year defeated the Persians in battle and captured Tabriz.8 
During the war, Persia had appealed to the British for aid under the 
terms of the 1814 treaty. Britain however, trying to reach an accommo-
dation with Russia, chose to see Persia as the aggressor and refused to 
extend any aid.9 Defeated in 1828, Persia ceded further territory and 
agreed to pay an indemnity to-Russia. The British then negotiated a 
release from their obligation to aid the Persians in return for a sum 
of money that Persia desperately needed to pay the first installment of 
the Russian indemnity.10 
During the first few years of the reign of Fath Ali Shah, the 
prospects for a Persian restoration had seemed rather good. In fact, 
when order was restored the economy began to recover and the population 
began to grow again. These conditions were most apparent around the new 
capital, Tehran, and in the northwestern province of Azerbaijan. In 
other areas however, recovery had barely begun. The south su£fered from 
oppression and neglect and Khorasan was still racked by wars and rebel-
lions. 'Militarily, restoration was even less successful. Efforts to 
regain the Caucasus ended with crushing defeats at the hands of the 
BBaddeley, The Russian Conguest of the Caucasus, pp. 152-181. 
9John B. Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf 1795-1880 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1968), p. 261; Melvin E. Yapp, "The Control of the 
Persia Mission 18_22-1836, 11 University of Birmingham Historical Journal, 
VII, 2 (1960), 170-71. 
10watson, History of Persia, pp. 243-245; Yapp, "The Control of 
the Persia Mission, 11 171. 
17 
Russians. Even in the east where there was less opposition, the Kajars 
could make little headway. But far from giving up, after 1828 the 
Kajars would try even harder to recover the east to make up for what 




In 1793 Zaman Shah, a grandson of Ahmad Shah Currani, won a 
brief war of succession to become ruler of Afghanistan. The support of 
Painda Khan, chief of the Barakzai branch of the Currani tribe, was 
decisive in his victory. In the next fifty years, the brothers of 
Zaman Shah and the sons of Painda. Khan were to dominate the affairs of 
Afghanistan. The Durrani tribe was very large with several branches and 
1 
numerous clans. Ahmad Shah and his successors belonged to the Sadozai 
clan, but other clans, such as the Mohammedzai of Painda Khan, were 
larger and more powerful and this situation caused many problems. 
Zaman Shah was detennined to restore the royal authority, which 
had eroded since the death of Ahmad Shah in 1773, and one of his chief 
projects was the reconquest of the Punjab. Secure control over Indian 
1The following table of the Durrani tribe is based on Ferrier, 
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revenues would have made him more independent of the westeni tribes. 
21 
But Zaman was never able to accomplish his goals. If he marched in one 
direction there would be invasions or revolts from the opposite direc-
tion. He had to keep moving between the Punjab and Khorasan. Zaman 
also had to face continuing opposition from the great tribal chiefs. 
In 1799, after discovering a plot to depose him, he executed several 
tribal leaders, including Painda Khan. Painda Khan's oldest son, Fateh 
Khan, escaped and joined Zaman's brother, Mahmud, who had previously 
fled to Persia.3 
Mahmud had revolted unsuccessfully several times with Persian 
backing, but now with Fateh Khan 1 s help he was able to defeat Zaman who 
was captured and blinded. Mahmud 1 s position was insecure however. 
Persian invasions threatened, the tribes were discontented, and another 
brother of Zaman, Shuja-ul-Mulk, was in anns against him. In 1803 Shuja 
succeeded in toppling Mahmud after three years in power. But Shuja's 
rule was effective only in Kabul and Peshawar since Mahmud's brother 
Firuz held Herat, and Fateh Khan controlled the country around Kandahar. 
Mahmud escaped from the prison where he had been confined and in 1809 he 
and Fateh Khan defeated Shuja, who eventually fled to India where he was 
given a pension by the British, and Mahmud retunied to power. 
As Mahmud' s right hand, Fat~h Khan was given a free rein and he 
energetically suppressed rebellious tribes and provinces and in 1816 he 
· 2.rhe few Indian provinces Zaman did control produced the largest 
share of his revenue. Hari Ram Gupta, "Afghanistan at Shah Zama.n's 
Accession 1793," Indian Historical Records Commission Proceedings, XVIII 
(1942), 130. 
J.rhe smnmary of these Afghan wars up to 1809 is based chiefly on 
accounts in Elphinstone, Caubul, II, pp. 308-52; and Ferrier, History of 
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was given an opportunity to extend his power to Herat. Herat had been 
practically independent under Firuz-ed-Din, who was appointed governor 
in 1801 by his brother Mahmud. The revolts and upheavals at Kabul made 
this quasi-autonomy possible, but at the same time they prevented Kabul 
from aiding Herat against Persia. Firuz was obliged to acknowledge 
Persian sovereignty and pay tribute from 1805 to 1811. When the Persians 
marched on Herat again in 1816, Firuz appealed to Kabul for aid. Fateh 
Khan came to Herat with an army although the resulting battle with.the 
Persians was indecisive. Fateh's supporters then seized control of 
Herat, deposing Firuz and all his officials. There was some plundering 
, . . 4 
and Fateh' s brother, Dost Mohammed Khan, even entered Firuz' s Harem. 
During his years in power Fateh Khan had made many enemies includ-
ing Mahmud's son Kamran, and most recently Firuz. At this point Fath 
Ali Shah of Persia sent Mahmud an ultimatum to dispose of Fateh Khan or 
face a massive Persian invasion.5 These combined factors, persuaded 
Mahmud to sacrifice his vizier. Fateh Khan was seized, blinded, kept 
6 
prisoner, and finally cut to pieces in 1818. Like Zaman, Mahmud had 
destroyed.the man who was keeping him on the throne and his fall was 
equally swift. Fateh Khan's brothers led a general revolt and assumed 
control themselves while Mahmud, Kamran, and Firuz fled to Herat. 
At first the brothers offered the throne to Shuja but when he 
would not agree to their conditions they parcelled the provinces out 
4r-errier, History, pp. 151-156. 
5Ferrier, pp. 151-156; Watson, History, pp. 193-197. 
6 Literally. John W. Kaye, History of the War in Afghanistan, I 
(London: W. H. Allen and Co., 1878), pp. 111-112. 
amongst themselves. Their mutual amity did not last long. In 1822 total 
chaos ensued as they began fighting among themselves and each province 
became in effect an independent principality. Kabul was the main prize 
and Dost Mohammed Khan finally secured it in 1826.' The rise of Dost 
• 
Mohammed provided some improvement in stability but only at Kabul. None 
of his brothers could ever get a solid grip on their provinces. Herat 
was also the scene of power struggles. By 1824 control had passed into 
the hands of Kamran. His father Mahmud, became a puppet and remained 
so until his death in 1829.7 
These continued civil wars and the division of royal authority 
were disastrous for Afghanistan. Herat was cast adrift and now isolated 
and surrounded by enemies. On the west, the Persians were eager to make 
good their long-standing claim to the city. On the east, only the dis-
unity of Fateh Khan's brothers prevented them from avenging him. Herat 
might have fallen to either one if it had not first begun to arouse the 
interest of outside powers. 
' 
7Ferrier, pp. 173-198. 
CHAPTER 4 
• 
RUSSIAN AND BRITISH DITERESI' S IN WESI'ERN ASIA 
Of the seventeenth century empires in Western Asia, only the 
Russian remained strong. In the tradition of the great universal empires, 
Russia saw itself as a force for peace, order, and security. All peoples 
and all nations had their place in the Russian system and even once-rival 
empires were tolerated as long as they acknowledged the supremacy of the 
1 
Russian Tsar. Russia's main concern in Western Asia was to keep the 
Ottoman and Persian empires in their place and to keep the whole frontier 
peaceful and quiet. 
Russia decisively defeated the Ottoman empire in 1828-29 and the 
victory caused the Russians to revise their policy towards the Ottomans 
which heretofore had been very aggressive. The war opened up for the 
first time the possibility of a complete collapse of the Ottoman empire. 
Mohammed Ali, the ottoman viceroy of Egypt, was practically independent 
and almost as powerful as the Sultan himself. The Russian victory in 
1829 convinced him that he either had to break away from the empire or 
be destroyed along with it. If he succeeded in that, the Ottoman empire 
would cease to exist and all Europe was fearful of the struggle that would 
1 Robert G. Wesson, The Imperial Order (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 




ensue for the remains. 2 In 1829 the Tsar decided that the dissolution 
of the Ottoman empire would be more dangerous to Russia than its continued 
existence and the disadvantages of such an event would far outweigh the 
benefits of any possible territorial gains. Russia would rather have a 
weak state that recognized its supremacy than to have it replaced by 
other, perhaps stronger or more dangerous powers. Russia therefore in 
3 
1829 committed itself to the maintenance of the Ottoman empire. 
Russia's relationship With Persia was similar. The Persians had 
been defeated twice and they now recognized the supremacy of the Tsar 
and his claim to the Caucasus. Russia on its part realized that further 
aggression against Persia would cause the total collapse of Kajar rule 
and therefore was satisfied with the situation. The Murid revolt in the 
Caucasus showed that the tribal anarchy that would likely ensue would be 
much harder to deal with. Beginning in the 1820's a religious brother-
hood, the Murids, led an anti-Russian crusade in the higher mountains. 
Russian efforts to "crush the movement only increased its strength, and 
excellent leadership welded the tribes into an effective fighting force. 
Although the Murid revolt was confined to the mountain tribes, it 
constantly threatened Russian communications through ·the Caucasus and 
made the strategic situation vis ~~Persia and Turkey very precarious. 
2Henry- H. Dodwell, The Founder of Modern E t A Stud of 
Mohammed Ali (Cambridge, England: University Press, 1931 , pp. -93; 
Daniel Thomson, Euro~e Since Napoleon (2nd ed.; New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1962), pp. 11 -120. 
3 . 
Robert J. Kerner, "Russia's New Policy in the Near East After 
the Peace of Adrianople, 11 Cambridge Historical Journal (1937), 280-86; 
Philip E. Mosely, Russian Di lomac and the enin of the Eastern 
iuestion (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ha:i;-vard University Press, 19 ), pp. 
-9. 
,, 4Baddeley, Caucasus, pp. 230-250. 
4 
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Eas~ of the Caspian Sea Russia faced the nomad Kazakhs. At times 
united and powerful, the Kazakhs had more often been divided into the 
Great, Middle, and Lesser Hordes. Serious defeats at the hands of the 
Kalmuk Mongols in the mid-eighteenth century led the Middie and Lesser 
Hordes to seek Russian protection. Control of the roving tribes was 
difficult however, and the Russians built a line of forts to protect 
their Siberian settlements from rai,ds. The tribal leaders made a formal 
submission in 1822 but the tribesmen still evaded control. The insecurity 
of Russian rule and the resulting instability were problems which were 
solved only after years of minor but constant warfare, in which the 
. 5 
Kazakhs were often supported by the Uzbeg Khanates to the south. 
The wars of the 1820 1 s established for Russia a position of 
predominance in Western Asia. Russia decisively defeated the Ottoman 
and Persian empires and made them acknowledge Russian supremacy, the 
Kazakhs had submitted, and only the Uzbeg and Afghan states and the 
Arabian deserts remained untouched by the Tsar' s power. Russia had 
every reason to be satisfied with this situation but it was not to go 
unchallenged. The Russian position and the British challenge to it that 
developed during the 1830's were the conditions that made Mohammed Shah's 
march on Herat in 1837 an event of more than purely local importance. 
The British East India Company, from small beginnings at trading 
stations along the coast in the seventeenth century, had come to dominate 
the entire Indian subcontinent. Because of poor communications links, 
the real rulers of India were the Governors-General and the bureaucracy 
5Gavin Hambly, ed., Central Asia (New York: Delacorte Press, 
1969), pp. lh0-148; Geoffry Wheeler, The Modern History of Soviet Central 
Asia (New York: Praeger, 1964), pp. 197-198. 
.~---~~---------------------"" 
29 
that had grown up in India itself. The Governors-General were carefully 
selected and they cooperated closely with their colleagues in the British 
Government, but in the early nineteenth century, British policy in 
Western Asia was for the most part determined by the political and 
6 
strategic needs of the Indian empire. 
Like all great empires, British India was concerned with order, 
stability, and undisputed domination. It tolerated minor states on the 
frontiers or within India only if they recognized British supremacy. 
Yet whereas the Russians could not conceive of an alternative to their 
empire, and attempted to integrate all their dominions and convince their 
subjects of the principle of Autocracy, the British always doubted their 
ability to.resist challenges in India, and they made little attempt to 
unify their possessions or provide an ideology for their rule. They 
lacked a sense of their imperial mission and their empire was insecure 
7 
as a result. 
Along with empire in India crune the need to protect the frontiers. 
Historically most invaders of India have come by way of the passes in the 
northwest. Some like the Moguls founded great empires, others like the 
Afghans had little lasting impact, Nevertheless the image of armies 
pouring out of the Khyber pass was well established. It was the activity 
of Zaman Shah and the schemes of Napoleon·that first fixed British 
. 8 
attentions on the Northwest. Considering Napoleon's accomplishments by 
~. c. Majumdar and K. K. Datta, "Administrative System, 11 British 
Paramountc and Indian Renaissance, Vol. IX of The History and Culture of 
the_Indian People Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1963), pp. 313-319. 
7wesson, The Imperial Order, pp. 10-11. 
8Alder, "Britain and the Defence of India," 15-22. 
30 
1806, it seemed plausible that he could arouse the nations of Iran and 
Central Asia and lead them to India. The participation of Russia in ' 
ef 
these plans only made the danger more real. The British response to this 
threat was to set up several buffer states in the northwest to absorb the 
shock and perhaps block an invasion. In 1808 and 1809, at the height of 
the French threat, embassies were sent to Afghanistan, Persia, Sind, and 
the Sikhs to secure treaties of alliance against Napoleon.
9 
The French threat was ephemeral and soon faded away but the buffer 
policy remained. The Sikh state of Ranjit Singh became the anchor of 
British policy in the northwest. Beginning in 1799, Ranjit Singh liad put 
together a compact state out of the many Sikh clans that had dominated 
the Punjab after the death of Ahmad Shah in 1773. Ranjit Singh' s treaty 
with the British in 1809 prevented him from expanding eastward and unit-
ing all the Sikhs, but gave him a free hand in the west. The strength 
of the Sikh state was its army, which was the most effective force in 
India outside of the British; But he did not build an administration 
that could function without his personal supervision and that was his 
greatest weakness, placing all his other achievements in jeopardy.lo 
The Sikh stat~ was a good buffer, effectively shielding India 
from the disorders in Afghanistan, but Ranjit S:ingh's westward expansion 
caused other problems for the British. After the collapse of Afghanistan 
9Alder, pp. 28-35; John H. Gleason, The Genesis of Russo hobia in 
Great Britain (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 19 0 , 
PP· Lo-41. 
10R. C. Majumdar, "The Rise and Fall of the Sikh K:ingdom, 11 British 
Paramount and Indian Renaissance, p. 247; Kushwant Singh, A Histo§'t of 
the Sikhs, I Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1~6), 
pp. 228-229. 
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in 1818, th~ Sikhs annexed th~ provinces along the Indus river one by 
one. In 182~ Ranjit forced Peshawar to pay him tribute. The involve-
ment of the Sikhs added a new dimension to the already complicated Afghan 
scene. British attempts to preserve peace on the Northwest frontier 
between the Sikhs and their neighbors eventually drew the British into 
war in Afghanistan. 
Important as· India was however, other matters also figured in 
British considerations. The balance of power in Europe was the most 
important but the economy was also beginning to command some attention. 
The industrial revolution was just beginning to take hold and trade was 
essential to keep the industrial machine going. Great quantities of 
food and raw materials were needed and Britain in the early nineteenth 
century was the world's greatest market, buying about one third of all 
other countries exports. It was considered the duty of the Goverrunent 
12 
to keep the sea lanes open and to ensure dependable supplies and markets. 
As time went on the economy assumed more and more importance in determin-
ing British policy around the world but during the 1830's political and 
military considerations came first. 
llFerrier, pp. 182-183; Kushwant Singh, A History of the Sikhs, 
I, pp. 251-254. 
12A. H. Imlah, Economic Elements of the Pax Brittanica (Cambridge' 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1958), pp. 4o, 123~145, 186-191. 
CHAPrER 5 
THE IMMEDIATE BACKGROUND 
1830--1834 
Many revolts had broken out in Persia after the end of the Russian 
war, especially in the East, and in 1830 the Shah charged Abbas Mirza, the 
Crown Prince, with the task of restoring order in that area. He first put 
-down rebels in Yazd and Kennan and then sent his amy across the desert to 
Khorasan. The year 1831 he spent in energetically suppressing rebellious 
tribes and districts so that by the end of the year order had been re-
stored. Khiva and Herat had supported these rebellions with encourage-
ment and promises of aid but after Abbas' easy victories they backed 
down and did nothing. Nonetheless Abbas Mirza decided that such inter-
1 ference could not go unpunished. 
It was apparent to Persia that the nomad Turianen were also a 
major source of instability ·on the eastern frontier. They blocked or. 
outflanked the routes to both Khiva and Herat, and their slave raids 
were the terror of the settled peasants. Abbas Mirza therefore made 
these nomads his next objective. In 1832 he attacked Serakhs, a Turianen 
stronghold and a major center of the slave trade. After a short siege 
the place was stormed, the defenders massacred, and the Turianen were 
quiet for a while. Abbas then summoned Krunran, the ruler of Herat, to · 







































demand that he resume payment of tribute. But Kamran sent his vizier in 
his place·and did not satisfy the demands of the Persians who then 
2 
planned another campaign. 
These Persian activities alarmed the British who were in the 
process of fonnulating a new defensive policy for India. In 1832 Shah 
Shuja wrote to the Governor-General asking for aid so that he could 
recover his throne and save Afghanistan from Persia,'but he was not 
3 taken seriously. But when a threat to Herat materialized, the Governor-
General changed his mind and gave Shuja a four month advance of his 
pension, knowing that this would enable Shuja to raise troops and march 
4 
to recover his throne. 
After his victory at Serakhs, Abbas Mirza was recalled to Tehran, 
leaVing his son, Mohammed Mirza, in charge. Leaving troops encircling 
Ghurian, Mohammed advanced directly to Herat and began to prepare for a 
siege. Abbas Mirza was also returning to ~orasan with an army of 
reinforcement and it looked as though Persian efforts would finally meet 
with success. But Abbas died in Mashad. When his son heard the news, he 
hastily concluded a truce with Herat and returned to Tehran to claim the 
. . f rin , position o Crown P ce. 
By 1834 Shuja had raised an anny and was preparing to march. 
. . 
After extorting more men and money from Sind, he negotiated a treaty with 
2 I 
Watson, pp. 262-265. 
3Great Britain, Foreign Office, Correepondence Relating to Persia 
and Afghanistan, Shah Shooja to Lord Bentinck, Bentinck to Shooja, Oct. 
20, 1832 (London: J. Harrison and Son, 1839), pp. 337-340, 339-340. 
4See P• 32. 
5Ferrier, p. 176; Watson, pp. 265-270. > 11:, 
J 
34 
Ranjit Singh whereby the Sikhs would get Peshawar in retunl for their 
aid.
6 
Thus Shuja had high hopes of success when he marched on Kandahar 
and these were confirmed when he defeated Kohendil Khan, a brother of 
Dost Mohammed, and took possession of that city. Dost Mohammed had been 
at war with Kohendil but he put this quarrel aside and marched to help 
his brother. In doing so, Dost left.his eastern flank uncovered, and 
Ranjit Singh promptly invaded and seized Peshawar while Dost defeated 
Shuja at Kandahar. Shuja soon returned to India and his British pension,. 
In summar.Y", between 1830 and 1834 Persia made a sustained and 
largely successful effort to reestablish its position in Khorasan, but 
this effort was cut short and mostly negated by the untimely death of 
Abbas Mirza. Britain was alarmed at the Persian activity and responded 
by encouraging Shah Shuja to regain his throne. Shuja failed but Ranjit 
Singh of the Sikhs gained Peshawar in the process. At the· same time 
Mohammed Ali began a war that almost destroyed the Ottoman empire. 
Russian intervention saved it and the Sultan then signed a treaty With 
the Tsar that convinced the British that Turkey had passed under complete 
Russian control. The treaty of Unkiar Skelessi·was actually a treaty 0£ 
mutual defense but the British thought it gave the Russian navy a one-
way door to the Mediterranean sea.
7 
All of this made the British deter-
mined to go through with their recently developed forward policy. 
6Aitchison, A Collection of Treaties, Engagements, and Sunnuds, 
VII, pp. 231-233. 
7nodweJl, The Founder of Modern Egypt; pp. 107-Jl5; .Kelly, 
Britain and the Persian Gulf, pp. 271-275; Mosely, Russian Diplomacy and 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FORWARD POLICY 
The Russian victories of 1828 and 1829 first called Britain's 
attention to Russia's dominance of Western Asia. At the same time old 
fears of an invasion of India by a European power, this time Russia, were 
revived. Longstanding concern for peace on the Northwestern frontier 
plus the new need to keep Russian predominance from spreading towards 
India, led Great Britain to develop what ro.ay be called the "Forward 
Policy •11 In its earliest fonn this consisted of a plan to open up the 
Indus river basin and the adjacent mountains to trade. British co:mmerce 
would bind the area together and tie it to Britain.1 This was essentially 
an expansion of the buffer policy as well as a solution to the conflicts 
in the area. Trade would be the local pacifying influence, with the extra 
advantage of offering new markets for British goods and thus stimulating 
the home economy. 
Lord Bentinck, then Governor-General, took the first steps in 
implementing the new policy. In the first place the commercial possi-
bilities of the area had to be explored. To this end a young British 
officer, Alexander Burnes, made his way in 1832 to Kabul, Bukhara, and 
1James A. Norris, The First Afghan War 1838-1842 (Cambridge, 
England: University Press, 1967), pp. 35-42. 
37 
38 
b k t I di th h P i f t find . . . 2 Th t t ac o n a roug ers a on a ac 1ng mission. e nex s ep 
taken was the opening of the Indus river to navigation. The Emirs of 
Sind were opposed to the idea until the British hinted that they might 
allow Ranjit Singh to expand at Sind's expense. Sind promptly agreed 
3 while Ranjit Singh himself was entirely agreeable to the plan. 
The events of the early 1830's convinced the authors of the for-
ward policy that they were correct in their analysis of the situation. 
With the Persian threat to Herat in 1833, Bentinck decided that a more 
active policy was necessary to protect the Indian frontiers. The British 
were always afraid of the unsettling effect the presence of a strong or 
unfriendly power on the frontiers would have on the internal peace of 
India.· Whoever held Herat could directly influence Kandahar and Kabul, 
and the forward policy made Kandahar and Kabul part of the Indian defense 
system.. Since Persia was presumed to be under Russian control after 
1828, a Persian Herat would bring Russian influence to the borders of 
India with possibly dire consequences. The British therefore decided 
to prop up Afghanistan in the hope that it would become strong and 
united under a ruler friendly to Britain. Shah Shuja was available and 
eager to cooperate. After the Persians withdrew from Herat however, 
Shuja's failure did not seem so serious and nothing further was done for 
the moment. 
The forward policy, originally developed by the Tory government, 
was adopted by the succeeding Whig government after 1830. The Whig 
2Norris, The First Afghan War, PP• 55-56. 
3Norris, pp. 53-55; Robert A. Huttenback, British Relations with 
Sind 1799-1843; An Anatomy of Imperialism (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 





Foreign Secretary, Viscount Palmerston, originally had no policy with 
respect to Western Asia, and he had allowed the forward policy to be 
carried out from India on its own momentum. But after the treaty of 
Unkiar Skelessi in 1833, the need to counter Russian influence became 
one of his main considerations. Palmerston went a step further and 
began to work towards displacing Russian influence, not just blocking 
•t 4 1 • 
39 
The years following 1833 saw a change in British public opinion 
which came to regard Russia as the chief threat to world peace. Russo-
phobia was accompanied by an outpouring of anti-Russian propaganda which 
pointed out how Russia was tightening its hold on the east and how this 
threatened British interests, especially in India. Russophobia however, 
was only the surface manifestation of the worsening rela~ions between 
England and Russia, reflecting the declining importance of Anglo-Russian 
trade, the contrast between liberal England and reactionary Russia, 
increasing knowledge of Russia which left unfavorable impressions, and 
the poor image of Nicholas I in Britain. Deeper was the vague and in-
tangible, grand geopolitical conflict between Russia, expanding in the 
heart of Eurasia, and Britain, expanding around the periphery of 
Eurasia.5 
Laregorian, Modern Afghanistan, p. 97; Sir Charles Kingsley 
Webster, The Forei Polic of Palmerston: Britain The Liberal Movement 
and the Eastern guestion New York: Humanities Press, 19 9 , p. 73 • 
5Gleason, The Genesis of Russophobia in Great Britain, pp. 1-18, 
284-290; Harold W. Temperly, England and the Near East; The Crimea 




WEAKENING OF THE RUSSIAN POSITION 
Although the forward policy was developed to counter the Russian 
dominance of Western Asia, the Russian position was not as strong or as 
secure as the British believed. Even though the treaty of Unkiar 
Skelessi apparently made Turkey dependent on Russia, the fact was that 
Sultan Mahmud was very dissatisfied with it. Throughout his reign Mahmud 
had struggled to restore imperial authority over the provinces that had 
become semi-independent. In this task he was largely successful, except 
1 
for Egypt. Mohammed Ali had grown stronger than the Sultan and although 
Russia had saved Turkey once and could do so again, the treaty of Unkiar 
Skelessi was purely defensive and the Russians even restrained Mahmud 
from taking any positive action. To preserve his empire, Mahmud felt he 
had to destroy Mohammed Ali and he began looking around for other help 
2 
to do so. 
The British thought that Russia controlled Persia as well but 
Persian policy towards Russia was governed by fear and the lack of any 
alternative. Britain had abandoned Persia in 1828 but as the forward 
-
policy developed, an effort was made to regain a foothold there. There 
1uriel Heyd, "The Later Ottoman Empire in Rumelia and Anatolia," 
The Central Islamic Lands, P.M. Holt et al., eds., Vol •. I of The Cambridge 
History of Islam, p. 36sr:= 






















were various moves to upgrade the embassy to Persia and in 1832, military 
3 
advisors were sent from India to train the Persian army. When Fath Ali 
Shah died in 1834, his grandson and heir apparent, Mohammed Mirza, was at 
Tabriz. Two of the late ruler's sons also claimed the throne, but 
Mohammed Mirza had the support of both Britain and Russia. Russia's 
offer to send troops was declined but British financial assistance was 
accepted and British officers led the army that defeated the other 
claimants.4 It might be expected that British influence in Persia was 
regaining lost ground. 
The Russian empire was also suffering from distracting revolts 
within its frontiers. In 1834 a new leader, Shamil, appeared at the head 
of the Murid revolt in the Caucasus. Shamil carried the fighting to the 
Russian controlled lowlands and intensified the struggle. Expeditions 
were sent into the mountains by the Russians, but although they could 
capture mountain strongholds, they couldn't hold them and they could 
• 
never lay hands on Shamil. The increased fighting put a strain on 
Russian finances and prevented them from coping with other problems. 
5 
The same situation was incurred by revolts in 1836 and 1837 among the 
Kazakhs. Kanesary Kasim united most of the Great and Middle Hordes 
against the Russians and for several years thereafter, made life on the 
frontier insecure,- interrupted Russian trade, and cut off Russian contacts 
.3Henry C. Rawlinson, England and Russia in the East (London: J. 
Murray, 1875), p. 49; Yapp, "Control of the Persia Mission," 172-174. 
4watson, pp. 279-285. 
5Baddeley, pp. 289 ff. 
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with the Uzbeg Khanates. These Russian setbacks however did not cause 
the British to abandon their policies. 
6 
Edward Allworth, ed., Central Asia A Century of Russian Rule 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1967~, pp. 12-24; Hambly, 
Central Asia, pp. 199-203. 
CHAPTER 8 
INTRIGUES IN AFGHANISI'AN 
1834--1837 
Of all the territories once ruled by Ahmad Shah, by 1835 only 
Kabul, Kandahar, and Herat remained, each under a different ruler. 
Economic ruin accompanied anarchy, and the population of Herat and 
Kandahar declined 60-70% in the years since the fall of Zaman Shah. 
1 
Kabul was better off but was barely holding its own. The only signifi-
. . 
cant result of Shah Shuja's invasion of 1834 was that it left the Sikhs 
in control of Peshawar. Ranjit Singh' s rule now extended all across the 
Indus up to the edge of the mountains. He had deprived the Durranis of 
their richest provinces and the loss was acutely felt. Responsibility 
for defense against the Sikhs and recovery of lost land now fell on Dost 
Mohammed. In May 1835, he faced the Sikhs in battle at the mouth of the 
Khyber pass. Some of his key leaders deserted however, and he retired, 
2 
defeated, to Kabul. Next Dost Mohammed tried diplomacy. In May 1836, 
he wrote to the new Governor-General, Lord Auckland, congratulating him 
on his appointment and expressing the hope that the British might restrain 
the aggression of ~the Sikhs. Auckland replied that it was "not the prac-
1 Gregorian, PP• 52-58. 
2Sir Olaf Carce, The Pathans 550 b.c. - A.D. 1957 (London: 
Macmillan, 1958), pp. 312-314; Ferrier, p. 204. 
43 
tice of the British Government to interfere with the affairs o~ other 
independent states. 114 
44 
Getting nothing from the British, Dost began to look elsewhere. 
Early in 1837 he wrote to Mohammed Shah of Persia complaining about all 
his troubles and asking for Persian aid. He even made the gesture of 
admitting Persian sovereignty, and stated that if Persia did not help 
him he would have to turn to the British. In return for Persian help 
against the Sikhs he would aid the Shah against Herat.5 Since there was 
little that Persia could do to harm the Sikhs at this point, Dost 
Mohammed was apparently trying to use the threat of turning to Persia 
to gain help from the British. In the absence of a response from India 
however, his feelers to the Shah took on more significance. 
While extending these diplomatic feelers, Dost made another try 
with his army. In April 1837 his son, Mohammed Akbar Khan, led the army 
out of the Khyber pass and defeated the Sikhs. But he failed to take 
any of the Sikh forts, much less Peshawar itself. Ranjit Singh poured in 
reinforcements, determined to hold Peshawar at all costs, and Akbar was 
6 
forced to retreat. Dost Mohammed was bitter over this frustrating campaign 
and even more determined to succeed another time. Afghan-Sikh relations 
were worsening at a most crucial time. 
This conflict upset the calculations of those in charge of the 
forward policy. For trade to flourish there had to be peace between 
4correspondence Relating to Persia and Afghanistan, Dost Mohammed 
to Auckland, May 31, 1836; Auckland to Dost Mohammed, August 22, 1836, pp. 
395-397. . 
5correspondence, Dost Mohammed to Mohammed Shah, pp. 27-28. 
6 
Carce, Pathans, pp. 314-315. 
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Afghans and Sikhs. The British were thus confronted with the problem of 
how to make peace between the two when neither would consider it unless 
he held Peshawar. At this point Auckland sent Alexander Burnes on 
another mission to Kabul. This was ostensibly a commercial mission to 
arrange for trade, but the Peshawar problem was at the heart of the 
matter since Dost wanted British support on that score before granting 
any concessions. Burnes' mission also took on another dimension as, 
while he was making his way to Kabul, the Persians were marching on 
7 
Herat. 
Herat was almost in ruins at this time. Struggles among the 
Sadozais, Persian threats and invasions, tribal raids and feuds, and 
cholera had reduced the population of the city from 100,000 to 40,000 
since 1810. The traditional industries collapsed as the people either 
died off or simply moved away. That Herat had survived at all as an 
independent principality is a comment on its enemies. Shah Mahmud died 
in 1829 and Kamran, his son, once he succeeded to the title, abandoned 
' 
affairs of state to his vizier, Yar Mohammed Khan. Yar Mohammed followed 
a policy of strengthening Herat while undermining Karn.ran and he soon had 
8 
complete control in his own hands. 
Herat would probably have fallen to the Persians in 1833 but 
for the death of Abbas Mirza. Yar Mohammed made an agreement with 
Mohammed Mirza to pay tribute but as soon as the Persian army was gone 
9 
he promptly forgot all about it., During the next few years Yar was 
7Norris, pp. 90-113, 118-123. 
8 . 
Ferrier, pp. 173-174; Gregorian, pp. 53, 42L.n. 
9corre~ondence, Ellis to Palmerston, December 30, 1835, p. 6; 
Ferrier, l?S-1~. 
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busy building up his power. In 1834 he established a measure of control 
over Seistan, which had gone its own way since the death of Ahmad Shah. 
This was a direct challenge to both Kandahar and Persia since they both 
claimed Seistan. Yar was also successful in controlling, or at least 
gaining the cooperation of the tribes surrounding Herat. He repaired 
the city walls, built up his army, and conducted purges of possible pro-
Persian people in his territory. By 1837 the vizier was in complete 
control, and Kamran was reduced to a mere puppet, in fear for his own 
life. Kamran continued to be useful however, as a scapegoat to blame 
10 
oppression and misfortune on. 
The strengthening of Herat was particularly threatening to 
Kandahar. Kohendil Khan, who ruled the city after his older brothers 
died in 1829, was afraid of the Sikhs and jealous of his brother, Dost 
Mohammed, the British were far away, so the only ones he could turn to 
for help against Herat were the Persians. In July 1836, Kohendil sent 
an ambassador to the Shah proposing that Kandahar submit to Persia, 
retaining only internal autonomy. Kandahar was then to help Persia 
against Herat in return for aid against Dost Mohammed and the Sikhs. 
Persia was agreeable because it could use the help against Herat, and 
also because Kandahar had once belonged to the Safavis and even its 
11 
nominal submission would be an accomplishment. 
10correspondence, McNeill to Macnaghten, January 22, 1837, p. 
26; Ferrier, pp. 76-77. 
11correspondence, Ellis to Palmerston, April 1, 1836, p. 11; 
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CHAPTER 9 
DETERMINATION IN PERSIA 
1834--1837 
After the death of Fath Ali Shah in 1834, most of Khorasan re-
volted. Restoring order occupied the new Shah's brother most of the next 
year and only after this could any plans be made. Mohammed Shah' s 
number one objective was the unfinished business of Herat. He was 
determined to capture it to make up for his own failure in 1833 as well 
as to continue the repeated efforts going back to the founder of the 
Kajar dynasty. The conquest of Herat was seen as the solution to many 
problems on Persia's eastern frontier. The encouragement that Herat 
always gave to rebels in Khorasan would be ended. It would also be an 
'• 1; 
indirect blow at the Turkmen and would serve as a warning to Khiva and 1'' 
Bukhara. Finally the possession of Herat could lead to the recovery of 
Seistan, Kandahar, and Baluchistan, all of which had owed allegiance to 
the Safa vis. 
In June 1836 the Shah announced his intention to march against 
Khiva and Herat. In this he was overly ambitious. There was cholera in 
Khorasan which precluded any operations in that direction. The Persian 
army then marched against the Goklan and Yomut Turkmen but it could not 
come to grips with them. Desultory warfare went on for several months 
and by November the army had fallen back to Astrabad, still skirmishing 
with the Turkmen. At Astrabad food was short, pay was in arrears, and 
47 
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1 
morale was very low. The campaign was a dismal failure. The contrast 
between this operation and the wars of Abbas Mirza four years earlier, 
in the same area, with the same army, against the same enemy, seems to 
indicate that the greatest failure was that of leadership. 
The British Minister had done his best to discourage Mohammed 
Shah from marching east in 1836, but he had to contend not only with the 
Shah's determination but also with the activities of the Russians. 
There was a change in Russian policy in Persia that apparently coincided 
with the arrival of the new Minister, Count Ivan Simonich,.in 1835. In 
1834 the Russians had cooperated with the British in Persia, but in 1836 
Simonich was actively promoting the campaign in direct opposition to 
British policy. More than that, Simonich promised Russian aid and 
2 
possibly helped the Persians with their financial preparations. 
The question arises as to why the Russians were doing this. The 
British were sure that it was for the purpose of subverting their rule 
in India. They always assumed that a Persian Herat would become a 
center of Russian influence, which would then spread to the borders of 
India, and they feared the effects of this on the internal peace of 
India •. The more extreme Russophobes tho-iight that the march on Herat 
would be the first step in the anticipated Russian invasion of India.3 
However the Russian motives were perhaps not so sinister. It may be 
1cor:respondence, McNeill to Palmerston, October 8, 1836, McNeill 
to Palmerston, November 3, 1836, pp. 20-21. 
2 
Correspondence, Ellis to Palmerston, January 8, 1836, January 
15, 1836, April 16, June 25, 1836, pp. 6-8, 13-16. 
3correspondence, Ellis to Palmerston, January 15, 1836, p. 8; 











assumed that they knew about British opposition to the Persian plans for 
Herat. Knowing this, they could see that if the Shah carried out his 
plans, the dispute could lead to a complete alienation between Britain 
and Persia. The British gains of the last few years would then be 
nullified and Russia's earlier position of primacy in Persia would be 
restored. This could possibly be accanplished by merely encouraging the 
Persians to do what they had already decided to do and at no risk to 
Russia. 
Late in 1836 a new British Minister, Sir John McNeill, arrived 
in Persia. His mission was to restrain Persia from attacking Herat and 
also negotiate a new treaty. The 1814 treaty had become embarrasing, 
especially the clause that pledged Britain not to interfere in a Persian-
Af'ghan war. 4 But McN eill was in an impossible position. Mohammed Shah 
was· not inclined to favor the British in spite of the aid provided him 
in securing the throne. In the first place the British had refused to 
aid Persia during the Russian war in spite.of treaty obligations to do 
so. Then they had taken advantage of Persia's desperate position to get 
out of the obligations altogether. Now, in violation of another article 
of the treaty, they objected to the Persian conquest of Herat, a project 
that the Shah saw not only as a legitimate national goal but also as a 
matter of personal honor. Simonich's task was made easy. 
After the unproductive campaign against the Turianen, Mohammed 
Shah dispersed his troops with orders to muster again the following 
spring. During that time McNeill worke9 hard to arrange a diplomatic 
settlement. The Persians were agonizingly slow getting started in 1837, 











and in June McNeill was able to obtain an agreement from Herat to cease 
all hostile acts against Persia and resume payment of tribute. But Yar 
Mohammed would not admit Persian sovereignty, and even if he had the 
Shah would not have accepted it. Herat had agreed to all this before 
and never kept its promises. McNeill was only wasting his time.5 · 
Yar Mohammed was definitely not wasting his time in these last 
few months. While the Persian army was dispersed he kept strengthening 
Herat's defenses and cementing his ties with the surrounding tribes. He 
6 
also worked to consolidate his hold on Seistan. Kohendil Khan in 
Kandahar was exceedingly alarmed by these moves. He wrote to the Persian 
governor of Khorasan urging him to strike at Herat while Yar Mohammed 
was fighting in Seistan. 7 While this brought no response from the 
Persians, the British took note of it and it greatly increased their 
worries. 
5correspondence, McNeill to Palmerston, June 30, 1837, Proposi-
tions to the Persian Government by Herat, Haji Mirza Aghasi to Herat, 
Various correspondence between McNeill and Haji Mirza Aghasi, pp. 41-57. 
6correspondence, McNeill to Macnaghten, January 23, 1837, 
McNeill to Palmerston, September 28, 1837, pp. 26, 64. 
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THE SIIDE OF HERAT 
Mohammed Shah left Tehran with a skeletal force on June 23, 1837. 
Units of the Persian army had assembled at various points along the route 
to Herat and others had been called up throughout Persia. By October 28, 
the army, now over 30,000 men, reached Torbat-e-Jam on the eastern 
frontier of Persia. During October the Persians suffered from cold, the 
horses were weak and worn out from lack of forage, supplies were low and 
could only be purchased at highly inflated prices, there was no discipline 
and no precautions were taken against surprise attack.
1 
At Torbat-e-Jam final plans were made for a four-pronged assault 
on the territory of Herat. Ghurian surrendered on November 15 and as 
the invaders approached, the Heratis proceeded to carry out a scorched 
earth policy. By November 23 the advanced guard of the Persi~n army 
reached the city, whose defenders put up a fierce resistance in the 
northwestern suburbs. However, the Afghan soldiers retreated behind the 
walls as the main body of Persians arrived the following day. Mohammed 
. 2 
Shah set up his camp southwest of Herat to await the city's fall. 
1correspondence, McNeill to Palmerston, November 27, 1837, p. 78. 
2correspondence, McNeill to Palmerston, October 30, 1837, pp. 64-
65; Ferrier, pp. 224-229. 
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The Shah had spent 155 days marching the 650 miles from Tehran 
to Herat. One hundred years earlier, Nadir Shah had covered 1200 miles 
between Isfahan and Kandahar, over more difficult and hostile terrain, 
in only 139 days.3 The contrast points out once again the poor leader-
ship in the Persian army. Mohammed Shah was not incompetent, he had 
been well trained in military matters and seemed to know what he was 
doing. But he was fatally indecisive. Even when he could be brought to 
decide on a certain course of action he would seldom follow through 
on it.4 
The inability of the Shah to make decisions had serious conse-
quences for the Persian army. Haji Mirza Aghasi, the Persian vizier, 
wanted to delay the taking of Herat until the Russians honored their 
promises of aid and his intrigues seriously hampered the war effort. 
The Persian officers seemed to be more interested in preventing their 
rivals from doing anything than in doing something themselves. There 
were indications that many of them had taken British bribes. Finally 
the Persians had to put up with both British and Russian observers who 
came with the army. The British constantly accused the Russians of 
aiding the Persians, but they themselves did not scruple about helping 
the Afghans in spite of their treaties.
5 
The greatest problem the Persians faced was how to feed their 
men. What little supplies they had were quickly used up and the lines 
back to Mashad were insecure and often impassable. 
3Lockhart, Nadir Shah, pp. 113-115. 
hFerrier, pp. 223, 229. 
5Ferrier, p. 229. 
The harvests around 








Herat took place in late Spring and late Fall so the slow Persian march 
gave the defenders plenty of time to gather the grain or destroy it. At 
first the Persians hardly had any food at all but in December and January 
they began sending out expeditions to gather supplies from the remoter 
countryside that had escaped destruction. In the Spring of 1838 the 
Persians planted their own crops and it was only after these were 
6 harvested that the supply problem was really solved. 
The resolve of Yar Mohammed Khan to defend the city was greatly 
strengthened by the timely arrival of a British officer. Lt. Eldred 
Pottinger was an artillery and political officer who was traveling on an 
unofficial fact-finding mission in Central Asia and just happened to be 
in Herat when the siege began. Some accounts say that Pottinger was 
sent on a secret mission to help Herat, others merely hint that he was 
more than just a traveller. It would not have been :inconsistent for the 
British to have sent him to help in the defense, they certainly had time 
to do so, but none of this can be proven.7 
The fighting during November was limited to skinnishing. The 
Persians made ineffective and uncoordinated attacks on the walls and 
fired cannon at random into the city. The Persians at first did not have 
enough men to completely surround the city and three of the five gates 
remained open. The Afghans were even able to send their cattle out to 
graze. By January the Persians had increased their force to nearly 
40,000 men and the ring around Herat had tightened but not closed. Winter 
6correspondence, Stoddart to McNeill, December 10, 1837, McNeill 
to Palmerston, January 26, 1838, McNeill to Palmerston, June 25, 1838, 
pp. 87, 90, 185; Ferrier, p. 232. 
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did not hinder operations but there were many desertions from the Persian 
army. One of the Persian divisions that had gone north had reached 
Maimana and succeeded in its objective of neutralizing the tribes. 
Meanwhile the Persians had advanced their trenches to within yards of 
the moat and mines were being dug under the walls. However there was 
no serious effort to storm the city. Both sides had settled in for a 
1 . 8 ong siege. 
The Persian .army at Herat was considered a direct threat to the 
forward policy and the security of India. The ~tubborn defense and the 
fact that the Persians could support a large army there seemed to prove 
the great strategic value of the place, both as a bulwark of defense and 
as a staging ground for invasion.9 The real reason for British alarm 
however, and what made this campaign different from and more serious than 
that of 1833, was the direct involvement of the Russians and the reper-
cussions this was having in Afghanistan. 
Simonich had encouraged this project ever since his arrival in 
Persia and had promised aid and furnished money to the Persians. Simonich 
was apparently free to use the money that Persia had collected to pay 
the rest of the indemnity from the Russian war. According to British 
reports, he used some of this ftmd to pay the expenses of the Persian 
army and also promised that if Persia took Herat the rest of the indemnity 
8 
Correspondence, Stoddart to McNeill, December, 1837, McNeill 
to Palmerston, January 26, 1838; McNeill to Palmerston, February 23, 
1838, pp. 87, 90, 97; Ferrier, p. 236. 
9correspond~nce, McNeill to Palmerston, February 23, 1838, 
p. 99. 








would be cancelled.10 Nothing short of sending Russian troops could have 
been more direct, but even worse from the British point of view was the 
activity of Simonich in A~ghanistan. He was trying to isolate Herat 
and arrange a coalition of states to help the Persians reduce the city. 
Both Kandahar and Kabul had reason to join such an arrangement and a 
major diplomatic battle developed at Kabul between British and Russian 
agents. 
Dost Mohammed was at the center of all this. The Sikhs, in 
alliance with Britain, were pressing him on one side while the Persians, 
supported by Russia were active on his other flank. He preferred the 
support of the British who were closer and more powerful, and able to 
restrain Ranjit Singh, but at the same time he reasoned that the British 
would be more eager to aid him if it was known that otherwise he would 
turn to Persia and Russia. The appearance in Kabul of Burnes in 
September, and Captain Vitkevitch, a Russian agent, in December, gave 
Dost a great opportunity to play one off against the other. 
Burnes was favorable to Dost Mohammed and argued his case in his 
reports to the Governor-General. Auckland however, stuck to his alliance 
with Ranjit Singh, whom he considered practically the only stable factor 
in the whole area. Certainly the recent history of Afghanistan gave 
little hope of long-range stability. Burnes therefore could offer 
nothing and this gave Vitkevitch his opportunity.
11 
Vitkevitch came from 
10correspondence, McNeill to Palmerston, December 16, 1837, p. 
79; Philip E. Mosely, "Russia's Asiatic Policy in 1838, 11 Essays in the 
History of Modern Europe, D, C, McKay, ed. (New York: Harper and Bros., 
1936), p. 54; Philip E. Mosely, "Russian Policy in Asia 1838-39, 11 
Slavonic Review, XIV (April, 1936), 675. 







Kandahar where he had been working on a treaty between Kohendil Khan and 
the Shah. In Kabul he spared no effort to point out the advantages of 
alliance with Persia and he made great promises of Russian aid. Dost 
would tell each what the other had promised in the hope of getting further 
promises but he could never get what he really wanted, Peshawar, from 
Burnes. Finally in March 1838, Burnes was asked to leave Kabul.
12 
When Burnes left Kabul, Kandahar had all but signed an alliance 
with Persia. As Auckland saw it, Herat was about to fall and Kabul and 
Kandahar had aligned themselves with Persi~ (Russia). Supported by a 
victorious Persia, the Afghans would likely take the offensive against 
the Sikhs. Ranjit Singh might not be able to hold his own and the 
defenses of India would be in shambles. The very events the forward 
policy was designed to prevent seemed imminent and Auckland decided that 
intervention was necessary. Auckland had other problems to worry about 
as well. In addition to Afghanistan, Nepal and Burma were threatening 
war on the Indian border. Relations with China were deteriorating over 
the questions of trade and opium. Mohammed Ali's armies were active in 
Arabia where they appeared to be pushing towards the Persian Gulf and 
finally the conflict between Mohammed Ali and Sultan Mahmud could flair 
up at any time with serious threats to European peace. 
As Auckland weighed his various alternatives the Russian govern-
ment was also reconsidering the situation. The result was that the Tsar 
decided to back off from the recent Persian policy. Exactly when and why 
he did this is obscure but the decision must have been made in March or 




I April of 1838.13 At that time the Russians couldn't have known about the failure of British negotiations at Kabul or of Auckland's decision. 
What they did know was that after several months the Shah had not been 
able to take Herat. They would also have known that Simonich's diplo-
macy in Afghanistan was alarming to the British. The Tsar possibly 
realized that if the situation did not change the British might over-
react and this could have far-reaching consequences. Under the circum-
stances he decided to recall Simonich and withdraw support from Persia, 
but unfortunately coillillunications were so slow that this decision did 
not become known until it was too late. 
Both British and Russian agents were active at Herat. The 
British accused the Russians of financing the whole Persian effort and 
there were suggestions that much of the Persian ineffectiveness was 
caused by judiciously placed British bribes. The real extent and 
effectiveness of this activity will probably never be known but some of 
the British activity was more open. In April, 1838, McNeill decided 
to go to Herat to see what he could do and when he arrived the Persians 
were preparing for a major assault. On April 18 the Persian cannon began 
a heavy bombardment which opened large gaps in the walls and an assault 
was ordered for the night of the 19th. McNeill later said that the 
troops were eager to go but they never got a chance for on the day of 
the 19th, McNeill talked the Shah into calling a truce and trying 
negotiations once again. The assault was cancelled and McNeill wrote 
Palmerston that whereas the Persians had been primed for an assault that 
13correspondence, Palmerston to McNcill, April 7, 1838, p. 91. 
night, it would be difficult for their morale to reach the same level 
again, 11 as I anticipated. 1114 
Shortly after McNeill left Tehran for Herat, Count Simonich 
decided to follow. He arrived on April 20, just after McNeill had 
62 
frustrated the assault and he exerted himself to see that this would not 
happen again. First he persuaded the Shah to cancel negotiations which 
had bogged down anyway. Simonich tried to inject new life into the 
Persian army, most importantly by keeping the Shah firm in his resolve 
to take the city. He also paid the Persian officers and men which did 
wonders to restore their morale. Finally Russian officers with Simonich 
advised the Persians and helped them with their plans. All the while 
Simonich did not know that he had been recalled.15 · 
By June the Persians had completely sealed off Herat. Crops 
' 
were being harvested and reinforcements were arriving regularly. 
Simonich's diplomacy was beginning to pay off as well, as a treaty was 
signed with Kohendil Khan that bound Kandahar to Persia. Simonich 
personally guaranteed the treaty in the name of the Tsar.
16 
Herat under 
siege was a different story. Supplies were running low, Persian cannon 
had caused widespread destruction, and there was disease and famine. The 
Heratis also had to suffer from their own defenders, the troops of Yar 
Mohammed, who ruthlessly confiscated supplies and money wherever they 
14corregondence, McNeill to Palmerston, May 12, 1838, pp. 126-
130; Kaye, PP• 2 4-255. 
15c6rre~ondence, McNeill to Palmerston, May 12, 1838, p. 127; 
Ferrier, pp. 2h~249; Mosely, 11Russia' s Asiatic Policy in 1838, 11 Modern 
Europe, pp. 53-54. 
16correspondence, McNeill to Palmerston, August 1, 1838, p. 185. 
j. 






could be found. Yar was also quick to crush even the slightest hint of 
a pro-Persian movement among the citizens. The people of Herat lived 
17 under a reigh of terror. 
With Simonich at Herat McNeill' s position became untenable. His 
presence only encouraged Herat to resist the siege and he was snubbed, 
ignored, harrassed, his messengers and servants attacked, until he 
decided that it was insufferable for the Minister of Great Britain to 
put up with such treatment. He made a final effort to resolve the 
differences between Britain and Persia and when the Persians rejected 
this he left Herat on June 7, and broke off diplomatic relations.18 The 
original Russian objective was thereby achieved but the far-reaching 
consequences that the Russians had feared were beginning to happen. 
These developments marked the low point as far as the British 
were concerned. McNeill had been forced to break with Persia. It looked 
as though the fall of Herat was imminent. Kandahar had allied with 
Persia and Kabul was leaning in that direction. The British on all 
fronts launched a massive effort to restore the situation in their favor 
and the first move was already underway. In order to exert direct 
pressure on Persia, Auckland had decided to send a small force to the 
island of Khark in the Persian Gulf. Five hundred Sepoys sailed from 
19 
Bombay on June 4. Auckland also began to increase the strength of the 
l7Kaye, pp. 269-270, 278. 
18correspondence, McNeill to Palmerston, June 25, 1838, including 
various correspondence between McNeill and the Persian Government, pp. 
149-184. 
19 . ~ 6 Kelly, pp. 29~-29 • 













Indian army and started negotiations with Ranjit Singh and Shah Shuja to 
arrange Suja's restoration to the Afghan throne. At the same time, nego-
tiations were begun with the Ottoman empire to put pressure on both 
Persia and Russia from that quarter. 20 
Throughout June rumors of warlike preparations of the British in 
India were reaching the Shah. He could only asswne, especially after 
McNeill's departure from Herat, that these were directed at him. The 
Persians also expected a British ultimatum threatening war if they did-
n't withdraw. Finally on June 22, Simonich received official word that 
he was recalled and that the Tsar had changed his policy. An emergency 
council was held and the Shah decided to make a final all-out effort 
before it was too late. An assault was ordered for June 24. 21 
The plan called for a simultaneous assault at noon, when both 
sides were usually sleeping, on five places along the south and west 
walls. The assault was preceded by a cannonade which was to make breaches 
in the walls. One of the attacking columns, at the southwest corner, 
turned back shortly after leaving its trenches. At the Irak gate and in 
the northwest quadrant, the Persians advanced to the foot of the rampart 
but were beaten back. The attack at the Kandahar gate was easily re-
pulsed and the Persians were chased back to their trenches. The southeast 
corner however, was the scene of bitter fighting and the issue was in 
22 doubt there for several hours. 
20Mosely, Russian Diplomaci, p. 134. 
21 Ferrier, p. 255. 





A French adventurer in the Persian army, General Semineau, was 
in charge of the Assault at this place. On the previous day the tower 
at the corner was demolished by cannon fire, much to the amazement of 
both Persians and Afghans. On the 24th, the assault commenced at noon 
as planned, but of the four battalions assigned to attack only one ·did 
so. These 400 men gained a foothold in the breach but they encountered 
fierce resistance. They called for reinforcements from the other 
battalions but these refused to move. Semineau claimed they were immo-
bilized by British gold and the orders of Haji Mirza Aghasi, the Persian 
Vizier. Finally Semineau prevailed upon General Berovski, a Polish 
soldier in the Persian service, to rally a few companies in support of 
the attack. But they fell back when Berovski was killed. Semineau 
claimed that Berovski was shot from behind and that he himself was 
wounded by fire from the rear. No further aid was forthcoming. The 
Persians in the breach held out for five hours but were eventually forced 
to retreat.23 
A slightly different story came from Lt. Pottinger inside Herat. 
After the heavy fire of the Persian cannon ceased, the Afghans relaxed 
and so were surprised by the assault at noon. At the southeast corner 
the Persians gained the lower trench and advanced to the upper one. They 
were thrown back but they advanced again and carried it. From there 
they assaulted the breach in the wall. They attacked and were pushed 
back several times. Both Yar Mohammed and Pottinger rushed to the scene. 
23Notes of General Semineau, quoted in Ferrier, pp. 250-254. 
' l 
66 
Yar Mohammed lost hope and was about to give up but the example of 
Pottinger, who rushed into action, restored his confidence. The de-
fenders were wavering but when Yar furiously rushed into combat they fell 
on the Persians and drove them back. 24 
The Persians were repulsed in total failure, due perhaps in part 
to the heroism of Pottinger or treason among the Persians ~ut fundamen-
tally to the complete ineffectiveness of the Persian army. Pottinger 
later said that the Persians could have taken the city the first day 
with proper use of the means at their disposal, and that one British 
regiment could have stormed the place with ease. Semineau claimed that 
if his plans had been followed not even the most blatant treason could 
have prevented victory. 25 
24Kaye, pp. 273-276. 
25Ferrier, p. 254; Kaye, p. 291. 
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CHAPTER 11 
THE BRITISH RESPONSE 
British activities continued unabated despite the Persian failure. 
The Shah was still before Herat, the situation in Afghanistan had not 
improved, and it was not known that the Russians had backed down. The 
expedition to the Persian Gulf reached Khark on June 17 and troops 
1 
landed two days later. On June 25 a treaty was signed at Lahore between 
Shah Shuja, Ranjit Singh, and the Government of India which reaffirmed 
the Shuja-Ranjit treaty of 1834 and cleared the way for Shuja to try 
again. This time there was no room for failure so it was decided to 
send British troops to ensure the success of the operation.
2 
British 
negotiations with Turkey also paid off as on August 18 the Sultan signed 
a commercial treaty with Britain that caused the Russians to become very 
3 
concerned about their relationship with the Ottoman empire. 
The British also sent an ultimatum to the Shah threatening war 
if he stayed at Herat. This was delivered by one of McNeill's aides, 
Colonel Stoddart, on August 11, 1838.4 The failure of the assault, the 
landings at Khark, the recaJJ. of Simonich and the loss of Russian support, 
1Kelly, pp. 295-296. 
2Norris, pp. 192-193. 
3Mosely, Diplomacy, pp. 36-37, 40-43, 102-109. 
4correspondence, Message to be delivered to the Shah, Stoddart 











the obvious difficulties of continuing the siege, news of unrest and 
rebellion in Persia, British preparations for war in India, and now an 
ultimatum, all combined to make Mohammed Shah give up. He agreed to 
the British demand to leave. 
The actual departure was delayed due to lack of baggage animals 
until September 9. Then, in the words of Col. Stoddart, "The Shah has 
5 
mounted his horse 'Ameerij' and is gone." The Persians had camped 
before Herat for 280 days. On his return to Tehran :in October, Mohammed 
Shah issued a proclamation stating that all his aims had been accomplished: 
the entire east including Kabul, Kandahar, and a host of minor places 
had submitted; Herat had been reduced to four bare walls and left power-
less; it was his concern, the proclamation continued, for the tranquility 
of his provinces, the approach of winter, and the warlike preparations 
of the British in total disregard for three treaties, that caused him 
6 to return. 
The departure of the Persian army brought little relief to the 
long-suffering Heratis. The city had been ruined by Persian bombardment 
and the Persian army had stripped the country bare before leaving. There 
was no food and no money even for the 8,000 people who were still alive. 
To raise revenue Yar Mohammed sold his own citizens as slaves to the 
Turkmen. Pottinger, and Stoddart who joined him after the Persians left, 
planned to convert.Herat into a bastion of British influence but they 
did not have much to work with. 
5~orreEJ?ondence, Stoddart to McNeill, 10:26 A.M., September 9, 
1838, p. 220. 
6 
Correspondence, Proclamation of Mohammed Shah, October, 1838, 
pp. 258-259. 
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Yar Mohammed however, did not resist the Persians only to become 
subject to the British. The slave trade was a major issue between them 
since the British wanted it suppressed. They also wanted to regularize 
the administration of Herat and modernize the army with the help of 
British advisors. The British were willing to finance these projects 
and Yar was cnly too glad to take their money, but that was as far as he 
was willing to go. He would have none of their projects and frustrated 
them at every turn. Showing his independence he carried on a friendly 
correspondence with Mohammed Shah, even proposing an alliance to oppose 
the anticipated British march into Afghanistan. Pottinger and Stoddart 
tried to get around the vizier by working through Kamran but that proved 
useless. Yar Mohammed remained in complete control of his own affairs. 7 
Although the-Shah had left Herat the Persians remained in occupa-
tion of Ghurian and several other forts. In Afghanistan Kohendil Khan 
was still allied to Persia and now planned to attack Herat himself, and 
Dost Mohammed had not changed his position so it was still necessary to 
restore Shah Shuja. In a declaration justifying his moves, Auckland 
mentioned the desire of the British to promote trade, the "unprovoked" 
attack of Dost Mohammed against the Sikhs, the intrigues of Persia through-
out Afghanistan, the "unjustifiable" siege of Herat, and the claims of 
Shah Shuja. In conclusion he stated, "the welfare of our possessions in 
the east requires that we should have on our western frontier an ally 
who is interested in resisting aggression, and establishing tranquility, 
in the place of chiefs ranging themselves in subservience to a hostile 







power, and seeking to promote schemes of conquest and aggrandizement. 118 
One day after the Shah left Herat the orders were given for the 
Indian army to assemble for the invasion. Kandahar was to be the first 
objective since Kohendil Khan was more involved with the Persians and 
from there the army could strike either at Kabul or Herat as needed. A 
Sikh army was to march directly on Kabul. On November 27, 1838, Auckland 
arrived at Ferozepore to meet with Ra.njit Singh and review the troops. 
. 9 
Several days later the armies marched. 
The British invasion of Afghanistan put the Russians in a 
difficult position. They had backed off in Persia to avoid provoking 
exactly this kind of reaction. They had lost much prestige because of 
their involvement at Herat, since all Asia knew that Britain and Russia 
were in confrontation and Russia had come out looking like the loser. 
The British invasion almost demanded some kind of response but Russia 
was powerless to intervene directly in Afghanistan. However, it was 
felt that a campaign against Khiva could have the desired result of 
restoring Russian prestige while not further antagonizing the British. 
Khiva was unconnected with the events at Herat and its conquest would be 
a direct benefit to Russia since it was a center of the slave trade and 
was supporting the Kazakh rebellion of Kenesary Kasim.10 
8correspondence, Declaration of the Governor-General, October 1, 
1838, pp. 299-303. 
9Norris, p. 231; Aurthur Swinson, Northwest Frontier: People 
and Events 1839-1947 (New York: Praeger, 1967), p. 43. 
10Memorandum of Nesselrode to Tsar Nicholas in Mosely, "Russian 
Policy in Asia, 11 675-681. 
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The attention of both Britain and Russia was diverted at this 
point to the Middle East where the Sultan had renewed the war with 
Mohammed Ali, lost his army, and died five days later leaving the Ottoman 
empire both defenseless and leaderless.11 While European peace hung in 
the balance at Constantinople the British army in Afghanistan plodded on. 
Kohendil Khan fled to Persia as the invaders approached Kandahar and 
Shah Shuja entered that city in triumph. Bowing to the inevitable, Yar 
Mohammed sent an embassy to congratulate Shuja on his success. The 
envoys negotiated an agreement with the British that recognized the 
prerogatives of Yar Mohammed and allowed a British resident to reside 
at Herat. D' Arey Todd, who had previously served with McNeill in Persia, 
was sent with numerous instructions that, if fulfilled, would establish 
British control over Herat.12 
Todd arrived in July and on August 13 concluded a treaty with 
Yar Mohammed and Kamran. The treaty recognized both Kamran's and Yar's 
positions and pledged the British to non-interference in Herat's internal 
affairs. Britain was to send money and officers to assist in defence 
against foreign enemies. Kamran promised to cooperate with Shuja and to 
submit any disputes to British arbitration. Kamran also promised not to 
correspond ~ith any foreign powers without British consent, to remove 
obstacles to trade-~ and to end the slave trade. The British felt that 
llDodwell, pp. 171-176; Webster, Palmerston, pp. 483-484; Gordon 
Graig, "The System of Alliances and the Balance of Power," The Zenith of 
European Power, J.P. T. Bury, ed., Vol. X of The New Cambridge Modern 
History (Cambridge,_ England: University Press,'1.960), p. 256. 







all their aims were accomplished by this treaty but they underestimated 
Yar Mohanuned.13 
The first serious fighting encountered by the Army of the Indus 
was at Ghazni which was stormed and taken. As the British approached 
Kabul, Dost Mohammed's supporters deserted him and after token resistance 
Dost fled to Bukhara. On August 7, 1838, Shah Shuja remounted his throne 
at Kabul after almost thirty years. By and large the Afghans accepted 
the restoration of Shuja. His receptions at Kabul and Kandahar were 
sufficiently enthusiastic to convince the British that he had considerable 
support. There was some unrest among the tribes and a force had to be 
sent against the Ghilzais in October, but it could now be said that the 
British had reestablished their defenses on the Northwest frontier. The 
forward policy was restored.14 
But in December 1838 the Russian General Perovski left Orenburg 
with 5,000 men and marched on Khiva. The expedition had been especially 
planned for winter when the deserts around Khiva were more passable.15 
This was widely seen as a countermove to the British thrust into Afghanis-
tan and the British were alarmed. There was even speculation that this 
was the oft-anticipated invasion of India and the possibility of a direct 
clash appeared. The British felt that they had to meet this challenge 
and to do so they had to postpone their planned withdrawal to India. 
13Aitchison, pp. 170-172. 
l4Norris, pp. 270-294. 
15Rawlinson, England and Russia in the East, pp. 150-151; Ferrier, 
p. 402. 
. -· ·-· - - . . - ... - - .. . ·-· .. -. . . ' 
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Preparations were begun to move across the Hindu Kush mountains into 
Central Asia.16 
75 
The serious escalation of the conflict that might have resulted 
was prevented only by the weather. Perovski's force encountered unusu-
ally fierce blizzards and was forced to turn back with heavy losses.17 
The British then abandoned their plans to move across the mountains but 
for one reason or other they kept postponing their withdrawal from 
Afghanistan. As time went on, their occupation forces took on a more 
permanent aspect. A :.regular cantonment was built and some of the 
officers even brought their wives and families. The British could never 
be sure that Shuja could survive without their continued support and 
Shuja's position seemed to be getting worse instead of better. 
The treaty signed with Herat in August did not end the British 
difficulties with Yar Mohammed. British money flowed into Herat, commerce 
resumed, agriculture recovered, and repairs on the city began. But the 
slave trade was not ended, no army or administrative reforms were under-
taken, and worst of all Yar resumed his correspondence with Mohammed 
Shah, professing friendship and even offering to place Herat under Persian 
protection. Yar also gave aid and reinforcements to Aktur Khan Alizai 
who led a rebellion of the Durranis against Shah Shuja beginning in 
December 1840. Herat seethed with intrigue as Todd, Yar Mohammed, 
supporters of Kamran, and enemies of the vizier plotted and counter-
16Norris, pp. 314; 318. 




plotted against one another. Through it all however, Yar was in con-
troi.18 
By 1841 the situation at Herat had deteriorated to the point 
where the British were simply pouring money down the drain. Todd 
realized this but he could do nothing with Yar Mohammed. The British 
76 
wanted a connection with Herat and Yar took advantage of this to get all 
he could out of them while preserving his own independence. Finally 
Todd gave Yar an ultimatum and witheld the subsidy until the vizier gave 
guarantees for his conduct. The specific guarantee Todd had in mind 
was the stationing of British troops in the citadel of Herat. Yar of 
course would not agree to this and told Todd either to resume the subsidy 
19 or leave; Todd left Herat on February 10, 1841. 
Todd's action in breaking with Herat was repudiated by the 
Government of India but the connection was not restored. There was a 
reaction against the British at Herat and many who had done business 
with Todd found their profits confiscated by Yar Mohammed. With the 
British envoy also departed the last hope of Kamran•s party to regain 
power. The prince's sons made a desperate attempt to seize control by 
themselves but their plot was discovered and they found themselves be-
seiged in the qitadel by troops loyal to the vizier. Kamran's sons 
appealed to the British but to no avail. After a siege of fifty days 
Yar captured the citadel. Kamran was stripped of his treasures and 
imprisoned and his sons were exiled. Yar Mohammed only awaited a 
l8Ferrier, pp. 407-411, 335. 




favorable moment to put an end to his nominal sovereign. 20 
Relations between Britain and Persia were in a state of suspended 
hostilities after the siege, mainly because of the continued occupation 
of Ghurian by the Persians. The Persian army had to be disbanded after 
the war for lack of funds, and revolts had broken out in many areas. By 
~ 
1841 it was becoming apparent to the Persians that continued hostility 
with Britain was doing them no good, and the British for their part 
still wanted to maintain some Persian strength against Russia. Perhaps 
it was Yar Mohammed's friendly correspondence that allowed the Shah to 
withdraw from Ghurian; in a:n.y case this cleared the way for a settlement 
and McNeill returned to Tehran. One of his first accomplishments was 
the signing of a commercial treaty in October 1841, and by March the 
following year the British felt safe enough to withdraw from Khark. 21 
The Middle East crisis also faded away as Britain and Russia came to see 
a common interest in preserving the Ottoman empire. British troops 
22 
landed in Palestine and Mohammed Ali's challenge to the Sultan collapsed. 
After his restoration, Shah Shuja was confronted with the old 
problem of tribal versus royal power. Backed by British troops and aided 
by British efficiency he was able to consolidate the central power. But 
the tribes resented their loss and felt that Shuja was a mere puppet in 
the hands of the British._ The most serious challenge to his rule came 
from the rebellion of the Durranis under Aktur Khan. This was suppressed 
20F . errier, pp. 471-472. 
21 Kelly, pp. 347-349. 
22Dodwell, pp. 189-191. 
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by British troops from Kandahar but it flared up again and Aktur Khan 
was finally defeated only in August 1841. Shuja was actually in an 
impossible position, surrounded as he was by British advisors and troops. 
The real ruler of Afghanistan was William Macnaghten, Auckland's chief 
aide whom he had sent as the senior political agent in Kabul. 23 
Auckland had intended to stay in Afghanistan only until Shuja was 
established but the longer the British stayed the more precarious Shuja's 
position became. The British invasion had been accompanied by an inflow 
of money which caused inflation, especially at Kabul. This undermined 
the position of the city classes and turned them against Shah Shuja. The 
occupation was also causing huge deficits in the Indian budget and there 
24 
was an attempt to cut back. On November 2, 1841 there was a demonstra-
tion against the British in Kabul that turned into a riot. Events got 
out of control before Shuja could do anything, the British garrison did 
nothing, and the riot turned into a rebellion. 25 
During December the whole country around Kabul was in arms against 
the British but still they did nothing. Mohammed Akbar Khan, Dost 
Mohammed's son, came out of the hills where he had been hiding and took 
charge of the revolt. Macnaghten was killed while trying to negotiate 
with Akbar, the army was isolated in its camp, and Shuja's authority 
23Norris, p. 340; Melvin E. Yapp, "Disturbances in Western 
Afghanistan, 11 Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, 
x:xv, 3 (1963), 33. 
2~rorris, pp. 340-360; Melvin E. Yapp, "The Revolutions of 
1841-1842 in Afghanistan," Bulletin of the School of Oriental and 
African Studies, x:iVI, 2 (1964), 338-345. 
25Ferrier, pp. 346-349; Norris, pp. 365-370. 
vanished. On January 6, 1842, the British commander negotiated with 
Akbar for safe passage back to India but while winding through the 
passes during the next few days, the British army was attacked and 
destroyea. 26 
26
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The city of Herat in 1837 and 1838 was the focal point of a 
number of pressures and conditions which, in conjunction made the siege 
a significant event. These ranged from personal and tribal jealousies, 
through the imperial pretensions of tribal states, to the global 
policies of great empires. In the en~ each of the military efforts to 
influence the situation failed and on the surface nothing was changed, 
but these failures only masked the reality of a much different situation. 
An essential.precondition to the importance of the siege was the 
state of economic exhaustion and political anarchy that prevailed in 
Iran in the 1830's. The great empires of the seventeenth century had 
collapsed and in the wars that followed, the prosperity of the area was 
destroyed. The weakness of the tribal states, Persia ·and Afghanistan, 
that arose out of the ruins was a constant source of instability that 
invited both internal revolts and outside influences. There was a power 
vacuum and powers on the outside inevitably became involved in what was 
going on within. 
The immediate motive for the siege was the desire of Persia to 
restore its vanished empire. Seen in this regard the campaign o~ 1837 .. 
was but the latest in a long series of attempts to regain lost territory 
in the east. Herat had been the main objective of these efforts since 
82 
control over Mashad was established in 1803. Whenever there was peace 
in the west, and no political crisis at hand, there was a Persian move 
to retake Herat. 
BJ 
The opportunity for Persia to achieve this goal was created when 
the tension between Sadozai and Mohammedzai finally tore apart the 
fragile structure of the Afghan state. Herat was cut off from the rest 
of Afghanistan and would appear to have been easy pickings for any of its 
numerous enemies if they could make a serious effort to take it. If 
these had been the only factors, the siege of Herat would have had only 
local importance but there were two more. 
There was the worldwide expansion of the British. The growth of 
the British economy fueled this expansion and the British were constantly 
searching for new markets and supplies. More importantly the British 
were the rulers of a great empire in India and were concerned for its 
defense. A keystone of this defense was a buffer on the Northwest 
frontier. The state of Ranjit Singh provided this buffer for a time but 
when a greater threat was perceived it was felt that a stronger buffer 
was needed. 
This greater threat was the apparent Russian domination of 
Western Asia. After 1828 and more so after 18JJ, it appeared as though 
the Tsar had gained control over Persia and Turkey and was using them to 
extend his power. Ths British were particularly afraid of the effect 
a Russian presence on the Indian border would have on the internal peace 
of India. The Russian position was not as pervasive or as sinister as 
the British imagined, but it was to some degree real and the Russians 
were concerned to preserve it. 
I, 
84 
Each of the parties involved saw Herat from a different perspec-
l tive. To Mohammed Shah of Persia, Herat was an integral part of the 
Persian empire. Historically, religiously, ethnically and in all re-
spects it belonged to Persia even though it was temporarily detached. 
The reconquest of Herat was a long-standing goal of his family and he 
was committed to it as a matter of personal honor. There was no question 
in his eyes as to the rightness of his cause. 
The Afghan chiefs each had different ideas about the position of 
Herat. To Kamran it was the last refuge of the Sadozai dynasty. For 
Yar Mohammed it was a place he had seized upon where he could establish 
his own power. These two had nowhere else to go. To Kohendil Khan on 
the other hand Herat was a mortal enemy that must be destroyed and if 
possible added to his own possessions. There was also a debt to pay for 
the destruction of Painda and Feteh Khan. Dost Mohammed also had this 
blood feud but he was less concerned with Herat. When the occasion 
arose however, he saw that Herat might be a useful bargaining point to 
accomplish other ends. 
Herat had long been !mown as the "Key to India" and the city 
retained that image in the eyes of the British. It was not that they 
felt they should have it in their own hands but that it had to be kept 
out of the hands of strong or unfriendly powers. Persia qualified as 
one of these after 1828. The British did not really fear a direct 
invasion but whoever held Herat was in a position to influence Afghanis-
tan and the forward policy made Afghanistan part of the Indian defense 
system. The internal peace of India was always the prime concern of the 
British and their interest in Herat varied as threats to this peace came 
and went. 
85 
To the Tsar and his ministers Herat was probably just another of 
the small principalities that dotted Iran and Central Asia. However they 
were no doubt aware of its importance to Persia and its relationship to 
British India. After the wars of the early 1830's it was apparent that 
Persia and Britain were at odds concerning the position of Herat. The 
Russians were in an excellent position to exploit this difference to 
their own advantage and this is the key to the whole affair. 
A tentative explanation for the Russian's actions in these years 
is that they decided to exploit the British fears for the security of 
their Indian empire in order to enhance Russia's own position in Persia. 
By encouraging the Persians in their objective of taking Herat, Russia 
could provoke a complete break between Persia and Britain, leaving the 
field to Russia. The risks to Russia were minimal, since Persia wanted 
Herat anyway and seemingly had the means to take it. The British fell 
for it completely. 
Things began to go wrong, however, when the Shah was not able to 
take Herat right away. This gave the British a chance to seize the 
initiative and they were quite effective in stalling the Persian effort. 
At this point Simonich decided that he had to act to counter the British 
moves. He sent agents into Afghanistan to arrange a coalition against 
Herat. Possibly he became personally involved in the siege or did not 
realize the implications of what he was doing. He may even have been 
acting against orders. In any case his actions and involvement were 
what touched off the British response. 
Those in control of Russian policy realized what was happening 
and ordered the recall of Simonich in April or May of 1838 to avoid an 
86 
overreaction by the British. But by the time the word got to Simonich 
it was too late, the damage had been done. The British saw their fron-
tier defenses in shambles and set armies marching to restore them. 
With the departure of the Persian anny from Herat the focus of 
the crisis was lost but the various moves underway went on independently 
to their conclusion. The British army occupied Afghanistan but could 
not hold it. The Russians made one attempt to restore their tarnished 
prestige but failed. The Persians continued to occupy the border for-
tresses until Herat went through the motions of professing friendship. 
This cleared the way for a reconciliation of Britain and Persia. The 
British sent another army back to Kabul to exact retribution but withdrew 
after doing no more th.8.n burning the Kabul bazaar. Only then was it 
possible to assess what had happened. 
In Persia the failure of the siege was followed by a near break-
down of the imperial government. The anny had to be disbanded, revolts 
broke out in almost all provinces, and the government was completely 
1 
bankrupt. There was no improvement .during the 1840 1 s. On a broader 
scale the siege marks the last attempt of the Persians to restore their 
lost empire. Before this there had been almost constant and continuous 
campaigns in the east or the west. The few Persian military efforts 
during the rest of the nineteenth century were sporadic, half-hearted, and 
almost totally unsuccessful. The foreign affairs of Persia for the 
remainder of the century consist mainly of dealings between Russia and 
Britain. 
1Lambton, ''Persia, The Breakdown of a Society," The Central 
Islamic Lands, PP• 449-452. 
' ,. 
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A more subtle change was also accelerated in Persian society. 
Symbolic of this, a Persian history written in 1882 concentrates on 
imperial events up to 1838 but after the siege of Herat is almost 
2 
exclusively concerned with the affairs of a single province. The 
decline of Persia had started quite some time before this, but after 
1838 the fall was precipitous. The Kajars had failed to restore the 
empire and people seem to have just lost interest. 
The changes in Afghanistan were not quite as profound. Dost 
Mohammed returned to Kabul after the second British withdrawal. He 
87 
worked to consolidate and extend his power and by the time of his death 
in 1863 had reunited Kandahar, and Herat with Kabul. Dost had been 
impressed with the fact that his power was dependent on British India 
and he was very careful not to give offense in that direction. The 
British occupation had also brought lessons in efficient administration 
which Dost tried to apply as best he could. 
Kohendil Khan also returned, to rule Kandahar until his death in 
1851. In 1855 Kandahar became subject to Dost Mohammed at Kabul. Yar 
Mohammed Khan continued at Herat and tried to rebuild his ravaged city. 
When he died in 1853 Herat was briefly occupied by Persia, but the 
Persians withdrew under British pressure and the city retained a pre-
carious independence until becoming subject to Dost Mohammed in 1863. 
Dost Mohruiuned's death in 1863 however set off another round of anarchy 
which lasted until the 1880's before the final shape of Afghanistan 
was attained. 
2Hasan-e-Fasai, History of Persia under Qajar Rule, trans., 
Heribert Busse (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1972), 





The most significant result as far as Afghanistan was concerned 
was that it was clearly made part of the British imperial system. Its 
role was that of a buffer, and it was not ruled directly, but it was 
strictly controlled. The British would repeat their invasion on two 
subsequent occasions to enforce this connection. The Afghans derived 
some small benefit however in that it did ensure the survival of 
Afghanistan. 
Russia had risked almost nothing in this affair and had lost 
only a small amount of prestige. But the Russians had learned some 
significant things. They had tested the British and discovered the 
limits beyond which they would react. In the 1860 1 s and 1870's Russia 
brought all Central Asia and the Uzbeg Khanates under its rule unopposed 
by Britain but stopped 100 miles north of Herat. Russia also proved to 
its satisfaction that a real or imagined threat to India could be very 
useful in dealing with the British. This was the first time Russia had 
tried such a move and it would not be the last. 
Finally the British had established the outer limit of their 
Indian empire and the line was drawn at Herat. The Russian conquest of 
the Uzbegs brought no British response but a threat to Herat sent armies 
marching. When Russia marched on Khiva in 1839 the British briefly 
considered moving deeper into Central Asia but as a result of this crisis 
the limit was pulled back to Herat and never moved again. 
The relations of Britain and Russia in Iran were thus defined 
between 1837 and 1842. Russia possessed a predominant influence in 
Persia but the British could not be excluded altogether. Afghanistan 
was a part of the Indian empire but anything beyond Herat was left to 
Russia by default. Persia and Afghanistan lost the ability to act 
c c .. 
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independently as they had done in the past. After all the numerous 
crises during the rest of the nineteenth century, and after all the 
comings and goings of British and Russian agents in what was called the 
"Great Game, 11 when the spheres of influence were officially drawn by 
the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907 they corresponded almost exactly 
with what was established by the events surrounding the Siege of Herat. 
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